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REGULATING SECONDARY MARKETS
IN THE HIGH FREQUENCY AGE:
A PRINCIPLED AND COORDINATED
APPROACH
Michael Morelli*
Technological developments in securities markets, most notably high
frequency trading, have fundamentally changed the structure and nature of
trading over the past 50 years. Policymakers both domestically and abroad
now face many new challenges impacting the secondary market’s effective-
ness as a generator of economic growth and stability. Faced with these
rapid structural changes, many are quick to denounce high frequency trad-
ing as opportunistic and parasitic. This article, however, instead argues that
while high frequency trading presents certain general risks to secondary
market efficiency, liquidity, stability, and integrity, the practice encom-
passes a wide variety of strategies, many of which can enhance, not inhibit,
the secondary trading market’s core goals.
This article proposes a regulatory model aimed at maximizing high fre-
quency trading’s beneficial effects on secondary market functions. The
model’s foundation, however, requires information. By analyzing more
data on how high frequency traders interact with markets, regulators can
assess the viability and scope of other potentially worthwhile measures
targeting more general market threats. Likewise, regulators can determine
who is in the best position to bear supervisory responsibility for particular
trading activities: agencies, exchanges, traders, or some combination
thereof. Crucially, the model also calls on regulators to share information
on a global scale: trading no longer only affects a single exchange, a single
asset class, or even a single country. By sharing information, global regula-
tions become more informed, secondary market stability is enhanced, and
regulatory arbitrage is minimized. In short, high frequency trading can be a
force for good, but a principled and coordinated effort is required to en-
sure it fulfills that potential.
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INTRODUCTION
High frequency trading (HFT) evokes strong emotions on both sides of
the political aisle.1 New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman
has called HFT “Insider Trading 2.0”2 while Senator Elizabeth Warren
simply branded it as “wrong.”3 CFTC Commissioner Scott O’Malia, a Re-
publican, also expressed a concern that regulators do not have the tools
necessary to supervise modern markets.4 Given the structural revolution
that has taken place in secondary markets over the past 25 years,
these reactions are expected. HFT has caused volumes to swell5 and
1. Compare Sam Mamudi and Dave Michaels, Hillary Clinton Steps Into High-Fre-
quency Debate with Tax Plan, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/polit-
ics/articles/2015-10-08/hillary-clinton-steps-into-hft-controversy-with-tax-proposal; with Press
Release, Senator John McCain, Statement by Senator John McCain on High-Frequency Trad-
ing Controversy (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/4/state-
ment-by-senator-john-mccain-on-high-frequency-trading-controversy.
2. N.Y. State Att’y Gen. Eric Schneiderman, Remarks on High-Frequency Trading &
Insider Trading 2.0, http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/HFT_and_market_structure.
3. See High Frequency Trading’s Impact on the Economy: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong.
19-20 (2014) (Senator Warren stating HFT reminded her of “the scam in Office Space” by
skimming “just a little bit of money from every trade in the hope that no one will complain”).
4. See, e.g., Silla Brush, High-Speed Trades Outpace CFTC’s Oversight, O’Malia Says,
BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-06/high-speed-
trades-outpace-cftc-s-oversight-o-malia-says.
5. Compare Market Turmoil; Averting Blizzard of Paper, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 1987),
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/25/us/market-turmoil-averting-blizzard-of-paper.html. (ob-
serving that trading volumes exceed 20 million shares for the first time) with Charles M.
Jones, What Do We Know About High Frequency Trading? 45 (Columbia Bus. Sch. Research
Paper No. 13-11, 2013) (stating today’s markets routinely have a daily volume exceeding one
billion orders).
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spreads,6 average trade sizes,7 and average holding periods8 to decrease
just as dramatically. Investors can buy or sell securities at astounding
speeds on trading platforms all across the globe, spurred by technological
advancements that have brought market participants closer together than
ever before.9 As HFT firms spend millions of dollars every year to in-
crease the speed at which they can trade,10 one may worry that trading has
become an end in itself, separating itself from the goods-and-services pro-
ducing economy.
Yet many politicians and regulators forget that algorithmic trading,
HFT’s predecessor, grew out of perceived necessity. In deciding to auto-
mate markets, regulators aimed to create and enhance price competition
on and between market centers, remedying technological issues that ac-
tively inhibited securities exchanges’ operations.11 Regulators viewed al-
gorithmic trading as the glue holding these new markets together, serving
to both connect and protect investors in ways human market makers could
not.12
In many respects, regulators accomplished these goals. Empirical evi-
dence suggests that HFT, by placing competitive pressure on brokerage
fees and spreads, is at least partly responsible for reducing transaction
costs.13 Other studies find that HFT also improves pricing accuracy in sec-
ondary markets.14 By paying constant attention to all order flow in a given
security, these studies suggest, HFT can form better estimates of that se-
curity’s price than can traditional human market makers. Similarly, other
evidence suggests that HFT’s constant buying and selling in the market
6. See DIV. OF TRADING & MKTS., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EQUITY MARKET
STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW, PART II: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 23-24 (2014),
https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/hft_lit_review_march_2014.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Jeremy Grant; Smaller orders breed dark pools and higher post-trade
costs, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/768b4e12-1f52-11df-9584-00
144feab49a.html#axzz42Qnky213 (noting average order sizes on the New York Stock Ex-
change decreased from $19,400 in 2005 to $6,400 in 2010).
8. See SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS 46 (2012).
9. At the end of the 1990s, it took 20 seconds to complete a trade.  By 2011, that
number fell to under 200 microseconds. Now, most trades can be executed in 10 microsec-
onds or less, with further enhancements sure to follow. See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir.
Fin. Stability, The Race to Zero, Speech Given at International Economic Association Six-
teenth World Congress 4-5 (July 8, 2011).
10. For instance, in 2010 twenty HFT firms paid an average of $140 million to access
an ultra-fast fiber-optic cable connection between exchange servers in New Jersey and Chi-
cago. See Alan Tovey, High-Frequency Trading: When Milliseconds Mean Millions, TELE-
GRAPH (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/10
736960/High-frequency-trading-when-milliseconds-mean-millions.html.
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. Id.
13. See DIV. OF TRADING & MKTS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 6.
14. See, e.g., Jonathan Brogaard, Terrence Hendershott, & Ryan Riordan, High-Fre-
quency Trading and Price Discovery, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2267 (2014); Ray Riordan & An-
dreas Storkenmaier, Latency, Liquidity and Price Discovery, 15 J. FIN. MKTS. 416  (2012).
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has bolstered liquidity15 and reduced overall volatility levels.16 Taken as a
whole, these studies suggest that HFT benefits the broader economy by
lowering many issuers’ costs of capital.17
Not all HFT-related concerns, however, are ill founded. It is contesta-
ble, for instance, that HFT conclusively improves asset pricing. Many HFT
strategies trade based only on short-term, non-fundamental information,
meaning they contribute little, if anything, to security price accuracy and
allocative efficiency.18 Meanwhile, HFT’s purported liquidity enhance-
ments are often selective, fleeting, and even illusory. Most HFT firms have
no obligation to maintain “fair and orderly markets.”19 Unlike market
makers of the past, HFT firms can withdraw from the market during peri-
ods of market stress, causing a dearth of liquidity when most needed.20
Likewise, studies show that HFT only boosts the liquidity of stocks that
were generally liquid to begin with, leaving other securities frustratingly
illiquid.21 Equally concerning, there is a widespread belief that HFT runs
unchecked as exchanges cater to its needs at the expense of other inves-
tors.22 This belief has undermined investor confidence, driving some retail
investors out of the market entirely.23
15. Liquidity refers to the extent the secondary market allows securities to be bought
and sold at stable prices. See Terrence Hendershott, Charles M. Jones, & Albert Menkveld,
Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?, 66 J. FIN. 1, 30-31 (2011).
16. Volatility refers to the frequency and magnitude of stock price fluctuations. Many
HFT strategies risk trading with counterparties that possess more or better knowledge about
a given security. This threat, known as adverse selection risk, generally incentivizes HFT to
update its orders often to reflect the most current information. In theory, more frequent
quoting allows investors to successfully trade at more accurate and stable prices, reducing
volatility. Michelle Price, High-Frequency Trading Shown to Have Positive Impact, WALL ST.
J., (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405311190339290457651225000721
6020 (reporting on conclusions of study conducted by Australia’s Capital Markets Coopera-
tive Research Centre); see also Christina McEachern Gibbs, HFT Does Not Create Volatility,
Says Buy Insider, WALL STREET & TECHNOLOGY (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.wallstreetand
tech.com/trading-technology/hft-does-not-create-volatility-says-buy-sider/d/d-id/1262315?.
17. Id.
18. Andrei A. Kirilenko et al., The Flash Crash: The Impact of High Frequency Trad-
ing on an Electronic Market 37-38 (May 26, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://
citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.409.319&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
19. See, e.g., Hendershott et al., supra note 15.
20. Id.; Jennifer Victoria Cristine Dean, Paradigm Shifts & Unintended Consequences:
The Death of the Specialist, the Rise of High Frequency Trading, & the Problem of Duty-Free
Liquidity in Equity Markets, 8 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 217 (2012).
21. See, e.g., Elvis Picardo, Top Stocks High-Frequecy Traders (HFTs) Pick, INVES-
TOPEDIA (June 2, 2014), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/active-trading/053010/top-
stocks-high-frequency-traders-hfts-pick.asp.
22. See Merrin, High Frequency Trading, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www
.economist.com/debate/days/view/816; see also Lanier v. BATS Exch., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3d
353, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[S]everal lawsuits against [certain] exchanges have been filed . . .
alleging that by offering such advantages to high-frequency traders, the exchanges have vio-
lated various federal statutes and regulations . . . “).
23. Id.
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On a more general level, HFT poses substantial risks to secondary
market stability. Regulation National Market System (Reg. NMS), en-
acted in 2005, purported to establish a single national market system
where the shares of any company could trade on any exchange.24 The new
system tried to strengthen, not weaken, markets by increasing trans-
parency, efficiency, and fairness.25 But as severe market swings, or “flash
crashes,” become an increasingly regular occurrence, markets appear
more interconnected and prone to disruptions than ever before.26 The ef-
fects of these disruptions are not limited to domestic trading, either: as
more issuers’ cross-list their stocks in multiple countries and more HFT
firms establish operations in various jurisdictions, these risks can only
increase.
Given how little regulators know about how HFT strategies actually
work in practice, addressing these risks is hugely important. But this arti-
cle argues that this information deficit is also why regulators must proceed
cautiously. Though policymakers have made significant efforts to address
HFT-related issues already, many are overbroad, target the wrong
problems, or overlook ways to harness HFT to improve key secondary
market functions. All HFT is not created equal; many HFT strategies, like
market-making,27 improve market stability and benefit investors while
other strategies, like momentum ignition and spoofing,28 are aggressive,
predatory, and value-diminishing. Regulators must encourage the former
and discourage the latter.
As a first step, regulators must expand their knowledge base. As pri-
mary market supervisors, they must be able to capably and reliably distin-
guish good HFT from bad. Registering HFT firms, collecting and
analyzing more complete trading data, imposing disclosure requirements,
and stress-testing HFT strategies are all useful measures that will shed
light on increasingly opaque and complex secondary markets. Using this
information, regulators can then assess the viability and scope of other
potentially worthwhile measures, such as adopting on-demand batch auc-
tion systems, altering minimum stock tick sizes, dynamically setting
maker-taker liquidity rebates, and setting order message limits. Likewise,
regulators will be able to determine who can best bear supervisory respon-
sibility for particular HFT activities: agencies, exchanges, other non-HFT
traders, HFT firms, or some combination thereof.
24. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 29,
2005) (adopting release) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§242.600-13).
25. See infra Part I.A.
26. See, e.g., Dave Michaels, Exchanges, Regulators Scramble to Fix ETFs After August
Rout, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2015-09-17/ex-
changes-regulators-scramble-to-fix-etfs-after-august-rout; Scott Paterson, Breakdown: A
Glimpse Inside the ‘Flash Crash’, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424052702303296604577454330066039896.
27. See infra Part I.C.1.
28. See infra Part I.C.3.
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U.S. regulators must not hoard this information. It is no coincidence
that HFT firms trade cross-listed stocks far more actively than non-cross-
listed stocks.29 As the globalization of secondary markets continues, regu-
lators would be wise coordinate their data gathering and registration
processes, fostering a more comprehensive understanding of exactly how
HFT strategies affect investors and global markets. Sharing data will have
other beneficial effects as well, like facilitating the quick and effective res-
olution of cross-border enforcement issues and informing more consistent,
high-quality regulations that reduce potential regulatory gaps. Such coor-
dination could also include synchronized responses to severe secondary
market disruptions, promoting cross-market stability and reducing sys-
temic risk.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out basic information about
markets and HFT for those unfamiliar with the topic, explaining at a high
level HFT’s historical origins, how modern securities markets work, and
how common strategies employed by HFT operate. Part II then explains
why secondary markets are beneficial to the economy. Based on this dis-
cussion, the article concludes by establishing principles that should guide
regulators as they think through the existing secondary market regulatory
framework as it applies to HFT. The application of these principles, and a
critical analysis of how well regulators’ current efforts adhere to these
principles, will be the topic of a future article, to appear in Volume 6, Issue
2 of this publication.
I. HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND SECONDARY MARKETS
From the outset, it is important to understand how secondary markets
work and how HFT fits into their structure. Although the following exam-
ples involve stocks, HFT is prevalent in secondary markets for most other
asset classes as well.30 This section demonstrates that regulators viewed
algorithmic trading, of which HFT is a subset, as a tool capable of fixing
significant market infrastructure issues. Following that, this section de-
scribes how modern secondary markets currently function and examines
how several commonly employed HFT strategies operate.31
29. Kiril Alampieski & Andrew Lepone, High Frequency Trading in UK Equity Mar-
kets: Evidence Surrounding the US Market Open, (April 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. research
paper, University of Sydney) (on file with the Capital Markets Cooperative Research
Center).
30. See, e.g., John Rennison, High-Frequency Traders: Bond Market Scourge or
Saviour?, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ab70bdf2-4507-11e5-b3
b2-1672f710807b.html#axzz42Qnky213.
31. For a helpful discussion of some basic vocabulary describing different types of or-
ders and specific services offered by trading venues to these traders, see Merritt B. Fox,
Lawrence R. Glosten, and Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense and Non-
sense, 65 DUKE L. J. 191 (2015).
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A. Historical Origins of High Frequency Trading
Before 1975, most equity trading in the United States took place on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The NYSE was composed of broker-
age firms who, upon joining the exchange as members, agreed to trade
assigned stocks on commission. These firms employed “specialists” who in
turn fulfilled these firms’ agreed-on obligation to “maintain fair and or-
derly” markets, standing ready to buy or sell these stocks throughout the
trading day.32 To this effect, specialists maintained stock inventories and
continuously posted quotes of prices at which they were willing to buy or
sell.33 Working as intermediaries, these firms pocketed the spread—the
difference between the prices at which they were willing to buy and sell
the stock—as profit.34
As members, these firms also agreed to abide by certain operating re-
straints. One restraint involved fixing minimum commission rates. In the
Buttonwood Tree Agreement of 1792, the original pact from which NYSE
emerged, members agreed to “not buy or sell from this day for any person
whatsoever, any kind of Public Stock at a less rate than one-quarter per-
cent Commission.”35 This structure aimed to reduce competition among
its members, although brokers still engaged in other forms of non-price
competition like free research or services.36 Nonetheless, commissions on
NYSE remained non-competitive for nearly two centuries.37
Starting in the late 1960s, societal and technological forces began exert-
ing pressure on the NYSE business model and pricing structure. First,
trading volumes increased exponentially. In 1968, daily trading volume on
the NYSE exceeded twenty million shares for the first time.38 Unfortu-
nately, at that time the NYSE still operated on a paper-based system,
meaning traders had to transport physical stock certificates (along with an
average of thirty-three administrative forms) from one investor to another
32. See, e.g., Nan S. Ellis, Lisa M. Fairchild, and Harold D. Fletcher, The NYSE Re-
sponse to Specialist Misconduct: An Example of the Failure of Self-Regulation, 7 BERKELY
BUS. L.J. 102, 109-11, 113 (2010).
33. Id. at 104 n.11.
34. Id. at 111.
35. See Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 663 (1975) (quoting the agreement).
36. Jeffery A. Eisenach & James C. Miller III, Price Competition on the NYSE, AEI J.
GOV’T & SOC’Y, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 16.
37. Over the years, NYSE took aggressive steps to stave off competition amongst its
members. For instance, in response to declining trading volumes during the late 1930s, NYSE
adopted a rule prohibiting its members from trading in its securities on another exchange.
The SEC later issued an order eliminating this rule, maintaining at least some minimal level
of price competition with regional exchanges. See Robert L.D. Colby & Eric R. Sirri, Consol-
idation and Competition in the US Equity Markets, 5 CAPITAL MKTS. L. J. 169, 180-81 (2010)
(citing In re Rules of the NYSE, 10 SEC 270, 272-73 (1941)).
38. Market Turmoil; Averting Blizzard of Paper, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 1987), http://
www.nytimes.com/1987/10/25/us/market-turmoil-averting-blizzard-of-paper.html.
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after every trade.39 In the resulting chaos, traders piled documents “half-
way to the ceiling,”40 and “stock was found everywhere from the women’s
bathroom to the trash bins.”41 Not surprisingly, stock certificates were
often misplaced, resulting in failed orders and lost shares.42 Eventually,
these logistical problems forced traders to end their trading early just to
catch up on paperwork.43
Second, institutions became the largest owners of equities in the
United States and began seeking ways to avoid paying NYSE’s high fixed
commission rates.44 To meet this demand, “third-market” firms started
conducting off-exchange block trades in NYSE securities at discounted
commissions.45 In 1969, Instinet established the world’s first electronic
market trading platform, allowing brokers to post offers to buy and sell
stocks off-exchange and after regular market hours.46 And in 1971, the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation Stock
Market (NASDAQ) opened as the world’s first electronic exchange. Un-
like the NYSE’s floor-trading specialist model, NASDAQ utilized an elec-
tronic quotation system and enlisted institutional market makers to
compete openly against one another away from a physical trading floor.47
The SEC noted these developments with apprehension. An estimated
$4 billion worth of securities had been lost in the NYSE’s paperwork tur-
moil.48 Ironically, many firms went out of business after they lost too
many shares, overburdened by the weight of their own success.49 While
the SEC acknowledged the benefits of price competition from regional
and over-the-counter (OTC) markets, increasing market fragmentation
meant that most investors lacked effective access to quote information on
39. David C. Donald, Heart of Darkness: The Problem at the Core of the U.S. Proxy
System and its Solution, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 41, 50 (2011).
40. Joel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or Perennial Irresolution: Stock Market Self-
Regulation During the First Seventy Years of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59
Bus. Law. 1347, 1366 (2004).
41. Market Turmoil, supra note 38.
42. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF
BROKERS AND DEALERS, H.R. DOC. NO. 92-231, at 13-14 (1971).
43. Id. at 28 (“The ‘Paper Crunch’ became so severe that the exchanges reduced trad-
ing hours and even closed one day per week in an effort to resolve these problems.”); Don-
ald, supra note 39, at 52; Seligman, supra note 40, at 1366.
44. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R.
DOC. NO. 92-64, at IX, XXII (1971).
45. Eric Zitzewitz, Retail Securities Regulation in the Aftermath of the Bubble, in ECO-
NOMIC REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 576 (Nancy L. Rose ed.,
2014).
46. See PATTERSON, supra note 8, at 109-11.
47. See Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of
Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 865, 899 (2008).
48. STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 42, at 7.
49. Seligman, supra note 40, at 1366, 1376 (stating between 1969 to 1970, approxi-
mately 160 firms went out of business “by having too much business”) (internal citations
omitted).
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emerging trading platforms.50 As a result, quotes across the market for the
same security varied considerably.51
Ultimately, the SEC decided to investigate ways it could stimulate
competition while also ensuring investors had access to information from
all markets. After reviewing the situation, the SEC concluded that a dras-
tic restructuring of markets was necessary. In its 1971 Institutional Inves-
tor Study, the SEC recommended to Congress that it “creat[e] of a strong
central market system for securities of national importance, in which all
buying and selling interest in these securities could participate and be rep-
resented under a competitive regime.”52 The next year, the SEC again ad-
vocated for “[a] system of communications by which the various elements
of the marketplace, be they exchanges or over-the-counter markets, are
tied together.”53 The SEC soon after issued a detailed policy statement
describing how its proposed consolidated transaction system would work.
In it, the agency called for the market-wide disclosure of price quotations
by exchanges via electronic data feeds.54 The policy went on to propose an
“auction trading rule” that would give price priority protections for all
public orders entered into a proposed central electronic repository and a
“public preference rule” where public orders entering the repository
would have preferential treatment over orders by professionals acting in a
principal capacity.55
The SEC’s efforts culminated in 1975 when Congress amended the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.56 The amendments, among other things,
banned fixed commissions,57 thus instilling intra-exchange competition on
NYSE, and authorized the SEC to develop a national market system akin
to the one proposed in its 1973 Policy Statement.58 The House Report
noted that markets were “stunted and distorted” by various practices that
“unnecessarily erected barriers to competition [and] insulated markets.”59
Decrying exchanges’ outmoded technological setups, the House Report
50. See, e.g., William J. Casey, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Changing Envi-
ronment for Private Pension Plans, Address at the American Pension Conference (Oct. 7,
1971) (“There has been an erosion of the central market. Institutional trading, as it increased
in volume, has drifted to the regional and [OTC] markets and to the third market . . . If you
like this, you call it competition. If you don’t, you call it fragmentation.”).
51. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, supra note 44, at XXI.
52. Id. at XXIV.
53. Policy Statement on the Future Structure of Securities Markets, 37 Fed. Reg. 5286,
5287 (Mar. 14, 1972) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 241).
54. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE STRUCTURE OF A CEN-
TRAL MARKET SYSTEM 8 (Mar. 29, 1972).
55. Id.
56. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012)) .
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(1) (2012).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2012).
59. H.R. REP. NO. 94-123, at 49 (1975).
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acknowledged a need to correct past practices that had led to “misalloca-
tions of capital, widespread inefficiencies, and potentially harmful frag-
mentation.”60 The Senate Report similarly felt that “new legislation [was]
necessary in order to assure investors . . . that our securities markets [re-
main] vigorous and efficient.”61 The Senate believed “many types of mar-
ket makers [were] necessary and that encouragement should be given to
all dealers to make simultaneous competing markets within the new na-
tional system.”62
NYSE, for its part, begrudgingly accepted the new electronic paradigm.
In 1976, the exchange introduced its “designated order turnaround” sys-
tem (DOT), which delivered orders to trading posts electronically, al-
though physical stock trading still took place on the exchange floor.63 And
in 1978, the SEC approved the NYSE-proposed Intermarket Trading Sys-
tem (ITS) plan that routed orders between various exchange floors.64 Crit-
ically, the ITS plan also included a rudimentary “trade-through” rule
prohibiting a participant from trading at an inferior price to that quoted on
another participant market without first routing an order to the better
market and giving it a minute to respond.65
By the 1990s, both NYSE and NASDAQ faced new sources of compet-
itive pressure from novel trading venues called electronic trading commu-
nications networks (ECNs). ECNs were computer systems that facilitated
trading outside of traditional exchanges or markets.66 Traders liked ECNs
because they provided another source of liquidity, allowed investors to
trade after-hours, and generally reduced their costs.67 The SEC recognized
that ECNs acted like markets but did not want to force them to register as
exchanges and risk stifling innovation and price competition. Thus, the
SEC passed Regulation Alternative Trading System (Reg. ATS) in 1999,
subjecting these platforms to certain operating and disclosure require-
ments, but ones less stringent than those imposed on exchanges.68 Al-
60. Id.
61. S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 12, 14 (1975).
62. Id.
63. Frank J. Jones & Frank J. Fabozzi, The U.S. Equity Markets, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
FINANCE, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS 125, 131 (Frank J. Fabozzi eds., 2008).
64. Order Approving NYSE et. al Plan for Intermarket Communications Linkage, Ex-
change Act Release No. 14661, 14 Fed. Reg. 17,419  (April 14, 1978); see also In the Matter of
Amex et al., Exchange Act Release No. 15058, 1978 WL 195796 (Aug. 11, 1978) (extending
ITS plan participation approval order to other exchanges).
65. Id.
66. See infra Part I(B)(2).
67. Michael J. McGowan, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading: Use and
Controversy, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 6 (2010).
68. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844
(Dec. 22, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.300-303 (2016)); see also Liz Moyer & Emily
Lambert, Wall Street’s New Masters, FORBES, Sept. 21, 2009, at 40-46, available at http://www
.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0921/revolutionaries-stocks-getco-new-masters-of-wall-street.html.
In 2015, the SEC proposed amendments to Reg. ATS that would dramatically increase the
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gorithmic traders, and later high frequency traders, flourished. Spurred by
Reg. ATS and the decimalization of stock prices, algorithmic traders be-
gan trading more often and in smaller increments, achieving better overall
average prices on their large trades.69
The SEC embraced algorithmic trading with enthusiasm, as several ex-
change-related scandals cast doubt on the integrity of traditional market
maker system. The “Odd-Eighths” controversy, for instance, developed af-
ter two finance professors discovered that NASDAQ dealers were collu-
sively maintaining artificially wide bid-ask spreads on NASDAQ stocks.70
By only quoting at certain intervals but not others, these market makers
increased the amount they kept as profit on each purchase or sale. In re-
sponse, regulators passed the Order Handling Rules, which required all
brokers to post quotes from competing firms alongside quotes from mar-
ket makers on the national system, including those from algorithmic trad-
ers.71 The rules sent a clear message: algorithmic traders could be an
effective source of competition for market makers and could instill more
discipline in the overall market system.
The 1975 amendments’ vision of was fully realized in 2005 once the
SEC approved Regulation NMS (Reg. NMS).72 Aimed at creating and en-
hancing competition on and between market centers for order flow, Reg.
NMS established an electronic network between all national, or “pro-
tected,” markets.73 Reg. NMS included a trade-through prohibition similar
to the one enacted in 1978, but now only with respect to automated, as
regulatory burdens associated with operating an ATS. If adopted, these trading platforms
would face extensive disclosure requirements and heightened oversight from the SEC with
respect to the design and operations of an ATS. See Regulation of NMS Stock Alternative
Trading Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 80,998 (proposed Dec. 28, 2015). Regardless of the new
amendments, these trading platforms remain an integral part of the modern marketplace: the
system has adapted to them, not the other way around.
69. Before decimalization, stock markets operated on a fractional pricing system. For
example, exchanges would quote a stock price in fractions (e.g., $10 1/8) as opposed to
decimals (e.g., $10.12). The SEC expressed a concern that fractional pricing caused artificially
wide spreads and hindered quote competition. The Commission ordered the exchanges and
NASDAQ to implement decimal pricing in 2000, and fully implemented the system in April
2001. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, COMMISSION NOTICE: DECIMALS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
FOR THE EQUITIES AND OPTIONS MARKETS (July 24, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/
decimalp.htm.
70. See, e.g., In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act Regarding the
NASD and the NASDAQ Market, Exchange Act Release No. 37542, 52 S.E.C. 882 (Aug. 8,
1996).
71. Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-37619A, 61 Fed. Reg.
48290 (Sept. 12, 1996); see also Thomas H. McInish, The Effect of the SEC’s Order-Handling
Rules on NASDAQ, J. FIN. RESEARCH (Sept. 22, 1998). Since NASDAQ market makers
routinely dealt with ECNs in private transactions, the rules effectively mandated that NAS-
DAQ display quotes from ECNs, thereby increasing price competition.
72. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 29,
2005) (adopting release) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 600-613 (2016)).
73. Id.
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opposed to manual, quotes.74 Thus, algorithmic traders were essential to
Reg. NMS’ regulatory design: regulators depended on these traders to
submit competing quotes to exchanges across the country. In their mind,
these traders would help consolidate order flow, reduce trading and execu-
tion costs, and increase market liquidity.75 Despite its laudatory goals,
Reg. NMS also substantially increased market complexity, as shown in the
next section.
B. How Modern Securities Markets Work
Three major types of trading venues exist in the United States: regis-
tered exchanges, Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), and Dark
Pools. All three types must operate in accordance with Reg. NMS.76 From
a business perspective, a trading platform’s profitability largely depends
on its ability to attract customer order flow—the more transactions that
take place, the more transaction fees they can collect. Advances in tele-
communications technology and increasing globalization of capital mar-
kets have intensified competition among trading venues for these
customers.77 Consequently, many trading venues view HFT firms as busi-
ness targets, adjusting their services accordingly.
1. Registered Exchange Trading
As stated, Reg. NMS governs modern exchange-based trading. For cur-
rent purposes, Rules 603 and 611 are its two most important provisions.
Under Rule 603, exchanges must send their best-priced quotations and
trade reports detailing the price and size of their latest executed transac-
tions to consolidated data feeds.78 The data feeds consolidate the data and
disseminate it to the public. Put another way, Rule 603 creates a single,
national order book that combines all the best quotes across exchanges.
To make this national order book operable, Rule 611 requires that sell
orders—regardless of the trading venue to which it was originally sent—
execute at a price equal to the national best bid (NBB), or highest availa-
ble price a buyer is willing to pay, across all registered exchanges.79 Simi-
larly, a buy order must execute at the national best offer (NBO), or lowest
74. Regulation NMS Rule 611, 17 C.F.R. § 242.611 (2016).
75. Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Enhancement and Moderni-
zation of the National Market System (April 2005), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch040605psa.htm.
76. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3606 (Jan. 21, 2010).
77. Ian Russell and Edward Waitzer, Should Exchanges Retain Regulatory Role in a
New Age?, FIN. POST (March 1, 2012), http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/role-
exchange.
78. 17 C.F.R. § 242.603 (2016).
79. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.611(a)(1), 242.600(b) (2016) (defining relevant terms).
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available price a seller is willing to accept. When this does not happen, a
“trade-through” occurs.80
Most markets are set up as electronic limit order books. In these order
books, traders provide liquidity by submitting limit orders to buy or sell
specific quantities of stock at a specified price, or remove liquidity by
sending market orders to buy or sell at the best available prices.81 When a
market order arrives, the exchange matches it against a resting limit order.
The exchange first prioritizes these orders by price and then, within each
price level, by their time of arrival.
For example, imagine John wants to buy 1000 shares of IBM and sub-
mits a market order. Gathering all resting limit orders in IBM from all
registered exchanges, the Rule 603 order book appears as follows:
BIDS OFFERS
PRICE SHARES PRICE SHARES
$40.41 NYSE  200 $40.42 NYSE  300
NASDAQ 200 NASDAQ 200
BATS100 BATS100
$40.39 NYSE  200 $40.44 NYSE  300
NASDAQ 100
$40.37 NYSE  300 $40.45 NASDAQ 600
$40.36 NASDAQ 200 $40.46 NASDAQ 200
Here, the NBB is $40.41 for a total of 500 shares and the NBO is $40.42
for a total of 600 shares. Let us assume John submits his order to the
NYSE. His order would initially execute for 300 shares at $40.42. Under
Rule 611, NYSE would then forward orders for 200 shares to NASDAQ
and 100 shares to BATS since shares are available on those exchanges at
$40.42. These orders would then execute on those venues at this price.
Afterward, NYSE would execute 300 shares at the next price level, $40.44,
and forward another order to NASDAQ for the remaining 100 shares at
the third price level, $40.45. John’s average price would thus be $40.426.
Data latency, however, creates complications. It takes time for quote
and execution data submitted by an exchange to reach the consolidated
data feed. Thus, quote changes on the national reporting system can lag
slightly behind the actual activities on a given exchange. Under Rule
80. Rule 611(a)(1) specifically requires a “trading center” to implement policies and
procedures that are reasonably designed to prevent these trade-throughs unless such trades
fall within one of the exceptions set forth in paragraph (b) of the Rule. 17 C.F.R.
§ 242.611(a)(1) (2016).
81. Market orders are unconditional orders to buy or sell a security at the best price
currently available. Limit orders, in contrast, are conditional orders to buy or sell a security
at a given price or better. For example, an investor could submit an order to buy 100 shares
of IBM so long as the price at which they buy is $40 or less. Once the market price reaches
$40, the limit order becomes “marketable” and acts like a market order.
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603(a), however, exchanges can distribute customized market data prod-
ucts directly to customers.82 HFT firms can, by purchasing these products
and co-locating their servers close to exchange processing systems, get no-
tice of changes in bids, offers, or executions slightly before the consoli-
dated data feed publically disseminates the information.83 Given their
technological sophistication, HFT firms act on this information before
someone like John could even see, let alone react, to it.
2. Off-Exchange Trading
ECNs are automated systems that match buyers and sellers directly
rather than going through a registered exchange. ECNs, like exchanges,
must abide by Rule 611. For instance, in the example from the previous
section, let’s say John actually wants to buy 10,000 shares of IBM and is
willing, given the large size of the order, to execute his trade at $40.52–a
price worse than all other quotes currently in the order book. If John is
trading on an ECN, the ECN would route limit orders to NYSE, NAS-
DAQ, and BATS to buy at $40.50 or better, which would then execute all
1,700 shares quoted for sale on the exchanges with better prices. The re-
maining 8,300 shares could then execute against contra-side orders in the
ECN at $40.52, bringing John’s average price to $40.505.
Dark pools are similar to ECNs except they do not send their best-
priced orders for inclusion in the consolidated data feed (thus the “dark”
moniker). Dark pools originally drew large institutional investors because
of this quote opacity: they could trade large stock positions anonymously,
minimizing possible price movements against their trading interests.84
Current dark pools, however, vary with respect to both who their custom-
ers are and what services they offer. Some dark pools, like block crossing
networks, offer specialized size discovery mechanisms that focus on bring-
ing large buyers and sellers together.85 These dark pools are extremely
discerning in whom they allow into their systems. Most dark pools, how-
ever, primarily execute trades with small sizes comparable to public mar-
kets.86 These dark pools generally match smaller “child” orders that are
part of larger “parent” orders and are less discerning as to whom they
allow into the pool.87
HFT firms like ECNs and dark pools because they often achieve
swifter trade execution and lower transaction costs as compared to many
exchanges. Specifically with respect to dark pools, HFT firms like their
82. See 17 C.F.R. §242.603(a) (2016).
83. Gary Stone, SIP vs. Direct Feeds Latency - What are the Rules?, BLOOMBERG
TRADEBOOK (May 15, 2014), https://www.bloombergtradebook.com/blog/sip-vs-direct-feeds-
latency-rules/; Nanex, Direct vs. SIP Data Feed, (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2/
4599.html.
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lower fees and pre-trade anonymity. These features put them in better po-
sitions to detect large institutional orders and trade against them.88
C. Commonly Employed High Frequency Strategies
Although many HFT strategies share common characteristics, HFT has
no official definition.89 Since many of these strategies have different goals
and disparate market effects, this is not surprising. As the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) recently pointed out,
“determining a precise definition may not even be practical for regulatory
purposes as it could easily become obsolete or the object of regulatory
arbitrage.”90
Nonetheless, “regulators can find it difficult to draw the line between
acceptable trading strategies and manipulation because of the complexity
of the strategies.”91 This section clarifies these difficulties by identifying
the four most common types of HFT strategies. Experts often label the
first strategy, market making, as a passive strategy and the latter three as
aggressive strategies.92 Passive strategies generally involve injecting liquid-
ity into the secondary market, i.e., where HFT actively posts non-marketa-
88. New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed a civil suit against one of the
largest dark pool operators, Barclays, under New York State law. A central allegation was
that Barclays misrepresented the level of aggressive HFT activity in its dark pool. Complaint,
Schneiderman v. Barclays Capital Inc., No. 4511391/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 24, 2014). One
industry observer noted that “[t]he problem [wasn’t] that high-frequency trading firms [were]
participating in dark pools. . . . the troubling . . . allegation [was] that the broker lied to clients
about the presence of a big HFT firm.” See Nicole Bullock, Momentum Builds for Dark Pool
Reform, FIN. TIMES (June 26, 2014), www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6ec5f93efd47-11e3-96a9-
00144feab7de.html.
89. For its part, the SEC offered a characteristics-based description of HFT in 2010:
“[HFT] typically is used to refer to professional traders acting in a proprietary capac-
ity that engage in strategies that generate a large number of trades on a daily basis . . .
[o]ther characteristics [include] (1) the use of extraordinarily high-speed and sophisti-
cated computer programs for generating, routing, and executing orders; (2) use of co-
location services and individual data feeds offered by exchanges and others to minimize
network and other types of latencies; (3) very short time-frames for establishing and
liquidating positions; (4) the submission of numerous orders that are cancelled shortly
after submission; and (5) ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as possible.”
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 76, at 3606.
90. TECHNICAL COMM., IOSCO, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY 21 (2011).
91. Peter J. Henning, Why High-Frequency Trading Is So Hard to Regulate, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/why-high-frequency-trading-
is-so-hard-to-regulate/?_r=0.
92. Matthew Baron, Jonathan Brogaard & Andrei Kirilenko, Risk and Return in High
Frequency Trading, 4-5 (unpublished manuscript), (April 2014) (on file with CFTC), http://
www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_riskandreturn0414
.pdf (noting “Aggressive HFTs earn substantially higher returns than Passive HFTs . . . sug-
gesting that there is a stronger profit motive for liquidity taking compared to liquidity provi-
sion”); GARY SHORTER & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44443, HIGH-
FREQUENCY TRADING: OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2-6 (2016), https://www.fas
.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44443.pdf.
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ble limit orders.93 Aggressive strategies, in contrast, involve taking
liquidity out of the market, i.e., sending orders into the secondary market
that are immediately executable.94
1. Market-Making Strategies
Market-making strategies inject liquidity into the market by regularly
offering to buy or sell a security and then pocketing the difference be-
tween the bid and ask prices. These strategies also profit from liquidity-
provision rebates offered by trading venues under the “maker-taker” sys-
tem. In the past, many exchanges charged a small access fee to both buyers
and sellers.95 Now, most exchanges have raised their access fee, collecting
the full fee to those traders who “take” liquidity by submitting market
orders that execute against resting limit orders, and rebating all or a por-
tion of the fee back to those traders that “make liquidity” by submitting
standing limit orders.96 Although only amounting to fractions of a cent per
share, the cumulative value of these rebates can be substantial.
A market-making strategy’s success depends on how fast it can react to
new information. As this information arrives, market makers incur ad-
verse selection risk, or the risk of trading with better-informed market par-
ticipants and losing money as a result. To mitigate this risk, HFT market
makers expend significant resources to ensure they can consistently posi-
tion their orders at the top of an order book, often canceling and replacing
their resting limit orders in rapid fashion. This also explains why HFT mar-
ket makers like specialized order types that allow them to maintain their




95. See, e.g., Stanislaw Dolgopolov, The Maker-Taker Pricing Model and its Impact on
the Securities Market Structure: A Can of Worms for Securities Fraud?, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
231, 270 (2014).
96. See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 76, at 3598, 3599; see
also, Dolgopolov, supra note 95 (discussing how variations in the maker-taker pricing model
across exchanges contributes to growing market complexity).
97. One such specialized order type is the “Hide-Not-Slide” limit order. Imagine that
the NBBO for IBM is again $40.41-$40.42 on NYSE. Further suppose that, for whatever
strategic reason, an HFT market maker wants to put a standing buy order at 2:00 PM at
$40.42 on the BATS exchange, and wait until someone hits it. Rule 611 prevents “locking”
the market at NBBO $40.42-$40.42. If the order submitted to BATS was a regular limit order,
the exchange would “slide” the price back to $40.41. But assume that one minute later the
NBBO shifts to $40.42-$40.43. BATS would “slide” the regular limit order price back up to
$40.42 and give it a time-stamp of 2:01 PM. A Hide-Not-Slide limit order works similarly,
except that the order would retain a 2:00 PM time-stamp, thus giving that order time-based
priority in the order book. See generally, In the Matter of EDGA Exchange, Exch. Act. Rel.
No. 74032 (Jan. 12, 2015) (sanctioning Direct Edge for selectively disclosing information
about how Hide-Not-Slide orders operated to its members).
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HFT market makers often claim their actions are positive because they
act as liquidity providers, reducing bid-ask spreads and market volatility
levels. The article discusses these claims in more depth in Part II.B.
2. Arbitrage Strategies
Arbitrage strategies take advantage of price discrepancies between
identical or related securities on different markets. Statistical arbitrage
strategies have always been a common practice and are relatively straight-
forward: traders try to exploit price differentials between correlated secur-
ities across markets. If two securities exhibit consistent trading patterns,
statistical arbitrageurs will assess whether an observed divergence is only
temporary. If so, then the statistical arbitrageur will trade against the tem-
porary price change and capture the pricing difference once the security
reverts to its historical relationship.98
Structural arbitrage strategies are a more recent phenomenon. Some-
times called latency arbitrage, a simplified example best explains how these
strategies work. Revisiting John’s quest to buy IBM stock, assume the
NBB and NBO remain $40.41 and $40.42, respectively. Next, assume that
the NYSE receives a buy order for 300 shares at $40.42 that executes. At
the same time, a new limit order boosts the NYSE’s best bid to $40.43,
meaning its best bid-ask quote is now actually $40.43-$40.44. HFT firms,
with their fast connection speeds and sophisticated algorithms, will quickly
perceive and react to this new order. They will buy all the shares on NAS-
DAQ and BATS at $40.42 and immediately sell them on NYSE for $40.43.
Traders quickly exploit these price differentials, which usually only last for
fractions of a second.99 Estimates calculate that trading on these advan-
tages accounts for upwards of $21 billion in profit per year,100 although
competition has reduced that number significantly.101
Statistical arbitrage is relatively uncontroversial sinceit fights pricing
discrepancies, facilitates price discovery, and improves market efficiency.
Commentators, however, have criticized latency arbitrage as having only a
mixed effect on market liquidity and market efficiency,102 while spurring
unnecessary and socially undesirable investment in faster connectivity and
order processing technology.103
98. See generally, Brogaard et al., supra note 14, at 2268, 2269.
99. Diego Leis, High Frequency Trading: Market Manipulation and Systemic Risks
from an EU Perspective 22-25 (Feb. 29, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2108344.
100. Matt Prewitt, High-Frequency Trading: Should Regulators Do More, 19 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 131 (2012).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Larry Harris, Stop the High-Frequency Trader Arms Race, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 27,
2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/618c60de-4b80-11e288b500144feab49a.html#axzz42bH3x6
JS.
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3. Directional/Predatory Strategies
Directional strategies look to profit from anticipated securities price
movements. One type of directional strategy called momentum ignition
consists of entering orders or a series of orders, perhaps combined with
spreading false rumors in the marketplace, to get other market partici-
pants to trade. These orders ignite rapid price movements up or down.
Another type of directional strategy, called spoofing or layering, involves
submitting a series of orders also intended to induce a rapid directional
price movement. If successful, the HFT firm will establish an early posi-
tion in the security, profiting when the price of the security moves in the
desired direction and the firm liquidates its position.104
A related third strategy, called quote stuffing, places many orders and
then cancels them almost immediately.105 These strategies aim to slow
down the market, giving the HFT firm a speed advantage. The sheer num-
ber of orders slows down the national limit order book, creating an artifi-
cial arbitrage opportunity.106 The HFT firm’s position also gains a
functional speed boost relative to other HFT firms that need to sort
through and analyze all the fake quotes.107 In some egregious cases, an
HFT firm may try to quote-stuff an entire exchange to have more time to
capitalize on cross-exchange price differences.108
These strategies are all heavily criticized for their rapid trading, short
holding periods, and generally non-beneficial effects on market liquidity
or price discovery. The difficulty, from a practical standpoint, is distin-
guishing manipulative patterns from legitimate ones when the volume and
frequency of trading is so high.
4. Liquidity Detection Strategies
Liquidity detection strategies try to find and trade against large institu-
tional orders. HFT firms will repeatedly submit small-sized orders in-
tended to detect large orders from institutional investors. Based on
intelligence gathered from this process, these strategies can then trade
ahead of large orders under the assumption that the large order will move
the market’s pricing of the security to their benefit.
104. See SHORTER, supra note 92, at 4.
105. Adam Adler, High Frequency Regulation: A New Model for Market Monitoring, 39
VM. L. REV. 161, 172-73 (2014).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. The CFTC and Department of Justice charged an HFT firm for violations involv-
ing quote stuffing. First, the firm’s algorithm would test the market by “pinging” orders. Then
the algorithm would place several layers of orders on the opposite side of the market from
the targeted trade—typically near, but not at, the prevailing market price—to create the
illusion of market interest that would then move futures contracts toward the targeted price.
In the Matter of Panther Energy Trading, LLC et al., CFTC Docket No. 13-26 (July 22, 2013)
United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653 (N.D. Ill.) (2015).
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One particularly contentious application of the strategy involves “flash
orders.”  The term refers to unmatched orders that an exchange “flashes”
to participating traders at the NBBO price for a brief period, usually be-
tween 30 and 500 milliseconds, and who then can choose whether they
want to trade against the orders before they are  routed.109 Some traders
and industry observers believe flash orders should constitute a form of
illegal front-running,110 and the SEC has expressed concerns that “flash
orders may create a two-tiered market in which the public does not have
access, through the consolidated quotation data streams, to information
about the best available prices for listed securities.”111 Others counter that
these traders are only trading on public information and thus should re-
main legal.112
D. High Frequency Trading in Global Markets
HFT is not a U.S.-specific phenomenon. With their sophisticated order
processing and communications systems, HFT firms can trade in almost
any market across the globe. Driven by competitive and technological
pressure from off-exchange trading platforms, many exchanges converted
from quasi-public entities to for-profit companies. This process, known as
demutualization, allowed exchanges to merge with domestic and foreign
counterparts to get more companies to list securities on their exchanges,
increase order flow, and generate more transaction fees.113
At the same time, trading in cross-listed securities has increased. Many
jurisdictions and exchanges allow companies to list their securities on ex-
changes in multiple countries so long as the issuer meets certain listing
standards and adheres to each country’s relevant regulations. In the
United States, the most common way of doing so is through American
Depository Receipts (ADRs).114 Simply put, U.S. banks buy foreign
109. Lawrence Harris & Ethan Namvar, The Economics of Flash Orders and Trading 4
(Jan. 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Medoza College of Business, Uni-
versity of Notre Dame), http://business.nd.edu/uploadedFiles/Academic_Centers/Study_of_
Financial_Regulation/pdf_and_documents/SSRN-id1953524.pdf.
110. See generally, MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014); see
also Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68
VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1666 n.207 (citing FINRA Rule 5720) (explaining the difference be-
tween illegal front-running and electronic front-running).
111. See Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS, 74
Fed. Reg. 48,632, 48,636 (proposed Sept. 23, 2009).
112. Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, What is High Frequency Trading? 8
(Dec. 12, 2014).
113. E.g., Nina Mehta and Nandini Sukumar, Intercontinental Exchange to Acquire
NYSE for $8.2 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news /arti-
cles/2012-12-20/intercontinentalexchange-said-in-merger-talks-with-nyse-euronext.
114. See Brendan M. Daniels, The Phantasmal Presence: American Depository Receipts
and Personal Jurisdiction, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 2 n.5 (2016) (“There are over 2,000 ADRs
in American markets. Since 2003 to 2013, it is estimated that the number of shares of ADRs
traded totaled around 146 billion with a value of $3.5 trillion dollars.”) (internal citations
omitted).
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shares in bulk from a foreign company, bundle them into groups, and then
reissue them as negotiable interests on a U.S. exchange. ADRs and their
foreign analogs offer HFT firms arbitrage opportunities. Cross-listed stock
prices on a foreign exchange might diverge from the home exchange price
for a variety of technical reasons.115 Exchange price ADRs, for instance,
in U.S. dollars will usually differ from the home market price due to ex-
change rates.116 Because the strategy is so simple, these opportunities dis-
appear quickly.117 These reasons incentivize HFT firms to continue
investing substantial resources toward bolstering the speed and adaptabil-
ity of their trading systems.
Issuers, investors, and exchanges have flocked to cross-listed securities.
As of January 2016, NYSE lists 513 foreign companies from 46 different
countries, with trading in those securities accounting for approximately
17% of total volume.118 HFT firms have shown a particular propensity to
target these securities, with one study finding that HFT participation at the
start of U.S. trading was 10% greater in cross-listed than non-cross-listed
stocks.119 Consequently, many exchanges now have extended hours to ac-
count for trading in cross-listed securities.120
II. ESTABLISHING AN EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK
A. Guiding Principles
Now that the reader has a basic understanding of the history and struc-
ture of secondary markets, we can establish guiding principles regulators
can consider as they grapple with HFT-related issues. In doing so, it is
important to consider, as an initial matter, why secondary markets exist to
begin with and what functions they perform.
Secondary markets are essential tools for promoting economic growth,
namely by pricing and re-pricing new assets quickly, accurately, and
fairly.121 Secondary markets lower transaction costs by establishing a fo-
rum where investors can trade their securities on-demand. Thus, estab-
lished secondary markets should induce investors to make more trades,
115. See, e.g., Minho Kim, Andrew C. Szakmary, and Ike Mathur, Price Transmission
Dynamics between ADRs and their Underlying Foreign Securities, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 1359
(2000) (examining the dynamic between ADRs and their underlying securities using three
pricing factors: the price of the underlying share in the local currency, the relevant exchange
rate, and the U.S. market index).
116. Id.
117. See James J. Angel and Douglas McCabe, Fairness in Financial Markets: The Case
of High Frequency Trading, 112 J. BUS. ETHICS 585 (2013) (stating that
118. Daily NYSE Group Volume in NYSE Listed 2016, NYSE (Feb. 29, 2016), http://
www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table&key=3141&cate
gory=3.
119. See Alampieski, supra note 29.
120. See Overview of Major World Exchanges’ Trading Hours, HKEX MONTHLY NEWS-
LETTER (H.K. Exchs. & Clearing Ltd., H.K.) July 2011, at 36-42.
121. See Fox et al., supra note 31, at 222-225.
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thereby generating prices that are more accurate. In turn, more accurate
stock prices should lower issuers’ costs of capital since investors, assured
that they can resell their investments at these prices, will demand lower
rates of return.122 Consequently, investors can readily determine the value
of their investments and creditors to evaluate the creditworthiness of their
borrowers.
Secondary markets also serve as important liquidity mechanisms.123
Primary market investors are less willing to contribute capital if it is diffi-
cult to exit their positions in the future. Secondary markets alleviate this
issue by reducing the costs that every investor would otherwise incur find-
ing contra-parties to their later securities transactions. In this sense, liquid-
ity promotes allocative efficiency: more liquidity makes it less costly to sell
securities in the future, meaning investors demand a lower return when
initially purchasing the securities.124 Similarly, liquidity reduces volatility:
the more available shares there are, the lower the risk that severe price
swings will occur during periods of market stress. This is important be-
cause a security’s price reflects the market’s confidence in the issuer’s
management. Higher volatility, therefore, may indicate higher riskiness,
possibly translating to higher costs of capital.125
Secondary markets also protect investors. Capital from investors en-
courages innovation, promotes competition, and spurs job creation
throughout the economy. If assured markets will treat their later transac-
tions fairly, investors will be more willing to make these contributions. Or-
ganized secondary markets help investors achieve this peace of mind
through rules prohibiting fraudulent trading and banning manipulation of
securities prices.126 Other rules target other aspects of fairness, like requir-
ing trade executions at fair prices, mandating market participants keep
records of their activities, and demanding prompt dissemination of pricing
information.127
Two major developments underscore investor protection’s importance.
First, more Americans are putting their personal wealth and retirement
savings into securities. Between the mid-1970s and the late 1990s, the
share of household financial assets held in bank deposits fell, while those
held in mutual funds and securities jumped from 22% in 1975 to 42% in
1999.128 Consequently, rising ownership rates expose more households to
122. Id.
123. See Hendershott, supra note 15.
124. LAWRENCE E. HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES 214-15 (2002).
125. See Fox, supra note 121.
126. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act §§ 9, 10(b), 18, 20 (1934); 15 U.S.C. § 87 (2012).
127. See Regulation NMS, supra note 24.
128. To a large extent, this shift stemmed from several financial innovations, like money
market mutual funds and Individual Retirement Accounts, which opened up previously
closed-off investing opportunities to Main Street America. See JOHN V. DUCA, FED. RES.
BANK OF DALLAS, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICA’S CAPITAL MARKETS 13-14 (2007),
https://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/efr/2001/efr0102b.pdf.
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large market swings. Second, while many recent technological innovations
in markets have been pro-investor, they also created new risks.129 As the
nature of securities trading continues to change, we must assure investors
that the market protects their interests.
HFT has advanced each of these functions. Research shows that some
HFT strategies, such as market making and arbitrage, help detect pricing
anomalies and therefore stabilize markets.130 Other studies suggest that
HFT has lowered transaction costs and increased certain measures of li-
quidity.131 And with respect to investor protection, abuses akin to the
Odd-Eighths controversy have all but disappeared.
But HFT also risks inhibiting these functions if not properly managed.
Accordingly, regulatory responses should focus on how to harness HFT to
improve these functions without sacrificing market integrity or stability. In
doing so, HFT regulation should pursue three primary goals:
1. Promote the secondary market’s performance of its key functions,
recognizing that HFT is a broad and diverse category of trading that
many historically thought benefitted secondary markets in key ways;
2. Foster confidence in the secondary market by protecting partici-
pants from emerging risks associated with HFT;
3. Minimize the chance that systemic, HFT-induced events interrupt
the market’s performance of these functions.
B. Problematic Issues with High Frequency Trading
Applying these principles, HFT raises important issues. While this arti-
cle separates these concerns into four broad (and overlapping) categories,
in a sense they are all indicative of a more general dissociative problem.
Exchanges serve to promote business investment by assuring investors
that they can always sell their shares at a published price. Today, however,
the act of trading is increasingly becoming an end in itself, operating to
separate itself from the goods-and-services producing part of the econ-
omy.132 Officials worry that trading volume is “unrelated to the funda-
mentals of the company that’s being traded.”133 As Professor Harris
astutely points out, HFT trading profits persistently and disproportionally
accumulate to a handful of HFT firms, creating what many consider a win-
129. See DIV. OF TRADING & MKTS., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EQUITY MARKET
STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW, PART I: MARKET FRAGMENTATION 7 (2013).
130. OFFICE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT
28-30, (2013), http://www/treasury.gov/initiatives/ofr/about/Documents/OFR_AnnualReport
2013_FINAL_12-17-2013_Accessible.pdf.
131. DIV. OF TRADING & MKTS., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra at note 6, at 27-28.
132. See Tor Brunzell, High-Frequency Trading–To Regulate Or Not to Regulate–That
Is the Question, 2 J. BUS. & FIN. AFF. 1, 2 n.1 (2013) (noting that in October 2008, one HFT
firm traded over 2 billion shares in a single day).
133. See David S. Hilzenrath, High-Frequency Trading Raises Concerns at SEC, WASH.
POST (Feb. 22, 2012) https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ economy/ high-frequency-
trading-raises-concerns-at-sec/2012/02/22/gIQAfpLdTR_story.html.
Fall 2016] Regulating Secondary Markets in the High Frequency Age 101
ner-takes-all industry.134 Decreasing competition means that trading costs
and the average cost of capital will rise.135 We must question whether the
increasingly large sums spent by HFT firms to boost their trading speeds
produce worthwhile social benefits.136
1. Price Accuracy and Allocative Efficiency Concerns
One worry is that HFT harms the secondary market’s pricing function
by trading based on short-term statistics unrelated to the fundamental
value of a given security.137 At the end of World War II, investors held a
US stock, on average, for four years. In 2008, that average time had fallen
to two months. By 2011 – 22 seconds.138 These trading patterns, officials
fear, obfuscate rather than clarify the financial health of the issuer in the
eyes of investors.139 Rather than contributing new information to stock
prices, HFT might actually drive it further away from its fundamentals-
based price (unlike long-term investors who analyze and trade based on
the underlying value of the stock), ultimately impeding allocative
efficiency.
Evidence provides mixed support for these claims. On an intraday ba-
sis, HFT arbitrage strategies, with their rapid execution speed, respond to
news ahead of other investors and potentially make stock prices reflect
new information more quickly.140 HFT’s long-term effect on price accu-
racy is less clear. Some studies suggest that HFT-initiated price move-
ments often have more lasting, long-term effects than price movements
initiated by non-HFT traders.141 Other research, however, shows that
HFT activity hampers price discovery by making markets “too efficient,”
causing stock prices to move excessively in the direction of fundamentals-
related news and ultimately harming longer-term price discovery.142
These studies, however, do not distinguish between the many types of
HFT strategies and their differing effects on price discovery. Market-mak-
ing strategies, for instance, tend to benefit price discovery more than
134. Harris, supra at 103.
135. Id.
136. In the HFT world, these sums are worth it: a one millisecond advantage in trading
could be worth an extra $100 million in annual profit. PATTERSON, supra note 8, at 287-78.
137. Kirilenko et al., supra note 18.
138. Patterson, supra note 8, at 46.
139. See, e.g., Hilzenrath, supra note 133.
140. See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 76, at 3608 (stating
HFT arbitrage activity “often may contribute to the quality of price discovery in a stock”).
141. Brogaard et al., supra note 14, at 2277-80.
142. See X. Frank Zhang, High Frequency Trading, Stock Volatility, and Price Discov-
ery 33-35 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=1691679.
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other, more aggressive strategies.143 And while arbitrage strategies trading
a single security across multiple markets can help price discovery, other
arbitrage strategies, like latency arbitrage, may instead be harmful.144 Sim-
ilarly, one study found that many HFT strategies tend to place buy (sell)
market orders just before an increase (a decrease) in the market valuation
of assets, suggesting HFT strategies that use market orders possess and act
on fundamentals-related information.145 In contrast, HFT firms buy (sell)
limit orders tend to execute when market valuations are falling (increas-
ing), suggesting that HFT strategies relying on limit orders are trading
based on more speculative, non-fundamentals-related information. At
least with respect to price discovery, these types of trading patterns are
less socially beneficial.146
The better question, therefore, asks to what extent HFT firms use
these latter parasitic strategies, since such trading could result in pro-
longed deviations from fundamental values and undermine conditions nec-
essary for markets to generate and synthesize information.147 Specifically,
if HFT reduces information-based trading’s profitability, traders have no
incentive to generate it. Consequently, if large traders are unable to hide
their trades from parasitic HFT strategies, this trading harms long-term
market efficiency by repressing the market’s information-generation
function.148
2. Selective Liquidity and Volatility Concerns
While it is generally undisputed that HFT has contributed to narrower
bid-ask spreads and lower transaction costs for many securities and inves-
tors,149 evidence suggests that HFT-provided liquidity is often selective
and fleeting. As an example, HFT firms may simply stop providing liquid-
ity or suddenly engage in liquidity-taking trades, especially during periods
of market stress.150 Even if HFT remains in the market, HFT contributes
deceptively little to the depth of shares available. Many HFT strategies
submit quotes for relatively small amounts of shares, rapidly canceling and
143. See TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORD. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REGULATORY ISSUES
RAISED BY THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY AND EFFI-
CIENCY 26 (2011).
144. See Prewitt, supra note 100.
145. See Brogaard et al., supra note 14.
146. See id.
147. See Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U.
RICH. L. REV. 523, 573 (2014).
148. Id.; see also Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipu-
lation” in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 509-10 (1991) (“Traders must be al-
lowed to disguise their trades to avoid disclosing the information they possess to other
traders.”).
149. See, e.g., Hendershott et al., supra note 15, at 30-31.
150. See Dean, supra note 20, at 224-25 (“Voluntary market-makers [like HFT firms]
can withdraw their capital from the market whenever they choose to do so, and history has
shown that when the market takes a downturn, they often do.”).
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replacing them with new ones in order to adapt to changing market condi-
tions and maintain favorable positions in order books.151 When spreads
were wider, average trade sizes used to be in the thousands. In 2015, the
average trade size was only 160-180 shares.152 Put another way, Rule 611
enables situations where HFT market makers may quote narrow spreads
but remain unwilling to buy or sell sizeable quantities at those prices. HFT
exacerbates these issues by displacing other kinds of liquidity suppliers,
like traditional market makers, who might have been willing to effect
larger transactions.153
Moreover, HFT-driven liquidity gains are generally limited to certain
blue-chip stocks that already had relatively high liquidity levels.154 HFT
firms, like all traders, prefer securities with narrow spreads and heavy
trading volumes since these characteristics reduce their own liquidity risk.
However, while aggressive traders typically like to trade in securities with
high volatilities (large price swings mean more profit opportunities), most
HFT actually prefers lower volatility securities because their strategies de-
pend on making small profits with near certainty. Similarly, while a typical
trader might be indifferent to a security’s price, the maker-taker rebate
system incentivizes HFT firms to trade in lower-priced securities since re-
bates are based on the number of shares traded, not the total amount
traded. In short, any liquidity gains are likely isolated to securities least in
need of the boost. Empirical evidence supports these claims. One study
found that while standard measures of market liquidity improved after the
introduction of HFT strategies for stocks with large capitalizations, there
was no significant effect on market liquidity for stocks with small capital-
izations.155 Another study, examining algorithmic more generally, simi-
larly found that its beneficial effects on liquidity accrued mainly to stocks
with large capitalizations and low volatility.156 In contrast, algorithmic
trading appeared to decrease liquidity for small cap stocks and not affect
the liquidity of high-volatility stocks.157
On the other hand, it is unclear whether HFT-provided liquidity actu-
ally increases or decreases volatility. One study, looking at the foreign ex-
change market, found that despite high correlations among HFT
strategies, no causal relationship existed between HFT trading and ex-
151. Gary Stone & Sanghyun Park, As Odd-Lots Report to Tape, Average Trade Size
Declines Again, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.bloombergtradebook.com/blog /
odd-lots-average-trade-size-declines-again/.
152. Id.
153. Because of their speed advantage, HFTs can supply liquidity on better terms than
slower traders. This creates an adverse selection problem for slow liquidity suppliers, who can
be crowded out of the market by HFTs. See Brogaard et al., supra note 14.
154. See Picardo, supra note 21.
155. Id.
156. Ekkehart Boehmer, Kingsley Fong, & Juan Wu, International Evidence on Al-
gorithmic Trading (Sept. 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2022034.
157. Id.
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change rate volatility.158 In another study, researchers found HFT was in
fact associated with higher levels of volatility. Analyzing the trading activ-
ity of thirteen NASDAQ stocks subject to a ban on short-selling for three
weeks in September and October 2008, the study found that HFT-associ-
ated trading volume fell sharply for those stocks compared to unaffected
stocks.159 Generalizing the short-sale ban as a negative shock to HFT ac-
tivity, the study concluded that stocks in which short-sales by HFT firms
were most affected (relative to other stocks) experienced relatively greater
increases in volatility, consistent with HFT’s general negative effect on
volatility overall.160
Even if we assume that HFT has generally reduced volatility at the
individual security level, it likely increased volatility at the macro level.161
One study found that higher trading volumes could destabilize market
conditions and produce “volatility above and beyond that based on funda-
mentals.”162 Interestingly, the study also suggested that there was an in-
flection point at which an increase in trading volume increases volatility
such that only a small circle of investors benefit.163 Instead, overall bene-
fits to investors “dominate at low to medium levels of trading.”164 In a
similar vein, Andrew Haldane recently pointed to the danger of normaliz-
ing deviance at the micro level, concluding that “thinner technological
slices may make for fatter market tails. Flash Crashes, like car crashes,
may be more severe the greater the velocity.”165 That the 2010 Flash
Crash started in the E-Mini S&P 500 futures market, one of the most liq-
uid in the world, seems only to add force to Mr. Haldane’s argument.
3. Market Stability and Systemic Risk Concerns
Systemic risk can refer to many things, but in this article, it refers to the
possibility that a certain contingency, event, or series of events could se-
verely disrupt market operations. Using this definition, HFT increases sys-
temic risk by making markets less resilient to serious market shocks. First,
Reg. NMS has made stock markets more interdependent and corre-
158. Alain Chaboud, et al., Rise of the Machines: Algorithmic Trading in the Foreign
Exchange Market, 69 J. FIN. 2045, 2066 (2014).
159. Brogaard et al., supra note 14.
160. See id. at 32-33.
161. Didier Sornette and Susanne von der Becke, Crashes and High Frequency Trading
6 (Swiss Fin. Inst. Research Paper No. 11-63, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1976249.
162. Id.
163. Ilia Dichev, Kelly Huang & Dexin Zhou, The Dark Side of Trading 30 (Emory L.
& Econ. Research Paper No. 11-95, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1754215.
164. Id.
165. Andrew Haldane, Race to Zero, Address Before the Int. Econ. Ass’n Sixteenth
World Congress (July 8, 2011), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches /2011/
speech509.pdf.
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lated.166 Many HFT firms employ similar strategies, suggesting that shocks
hitting a few active HFT firms can have knock-on effects detrimentally
affecting multiple exchanges, trading platforms, and investors.167 The ef-
fects may not be limited to one particular asset class: HFT also exacer-
bates price shocks between derivatives and their underlying assets,
between stocks and their ETFs, or between foreign stocks and their corre-
sponding ADRs. This makes markets move together, implying higher
levels of systemic risk.168
Second, HFT firms rely on pre-programmed algorithms to make
thousands of trading decisions every second based on many assumed mar-
ket conditions. Small programmatic errors or changes in trading conditions
can affect HFT algorithms in unexpected ways, leading to potentially sig-
nificant trading errors and major disruptions across multiple markets.169
This is a particular worry with algorithms interpreting qualitative data
since it is harder for them to determine whether it contains mistakes or
errors. Again, it is extremely difficult for HFT firms, let alone regulators,
to isolate and correct their strategies on a real-time basis since these strat-
egies can place orders in multiple venues across different markets.170
Third, even if HFT does not cause a particular market disruption, these
strategies can still exacerbate its effects. HFT firms have no market-mak-
ing obligation to maintain “fair and orderly markets.”171 Consequently,
HFT firms, especially those using aggressive or predatory strategies, can
freely withdraw from the market during periods of stress, resulting in a
dearth of liquidity at critical junctures. These market exits in turn risk
transmitting illiquidity across markets, increasing systemic risk.172
4. Investor Protection and Market Integrity Concerns
The directional strategies outlined in Part I.C.3 illustrate how certain
HFT strategies can exploit and harm other traders.173 It is an open debate,
however, as to exactly which investors these strategies harm the most. One
study found that on a per contract basis, traders who focused on company-
specific events when determining whether to buy or sell a stock (i.e. funda-
mentals traders) incurred the least cost to HFT whereas small traders in-
curred the most.174 The study also noted that the fundamentals traders
166. See Kristin Forbes & Roberto Rigobon, No Contagion, Only Interdependence:
Measuring Stock Market Co-Movements, 57 J. FIN. 2223, 2242 (2002).
167. Brogaard finds that NASDAQ HFTs tend to place market and limit orders in the
same direction over various time intervals. See Brogaard et al., supra note 14.
168. See Forbes & Rigobon, supra note 162.
169. See Bernard S. Donefer, Algos Gone Wild: Risk in the World of Automated Trad-
ing Strategies, 5 J. TRADING 31 (2010).
170. Id.
171. See PATTERSON, supra note 8, at 260-77 (2012).
172. Kirilenko et al., supra note 18.
173. See CFTC v. Moncada, 31 F. Supp. 3d 614, 616-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
174. See Baron, supra note 89.
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were more likely to be large institutions while the small traders were more
likely to be retail investors.175 Blackrock, in contrast, asserted that HFT
generally does not affect retail investors since their orders are small and
usually filled completely and immediately at the NBBO.176 In a similar
vein, other studies concluded that institutional investors, at least when
trading against order anticipation and momentum ignition strategies, in-
curred higher transaction costs than retail investors.177 Another framing of
the issue differentiates between fundamentals and non-fundamentals trad-
ers. Short-term HFT strategies are more prone to herd to the same infor-
mation, driving a security’s price further away from the price dictated by
its fundamentals.178 Put differently, the more momentum traders there
are, the more likely it is a security’s price will diverge from its fundamen-
tals and the less likely it is that fundamentals trader will be successful.
Despite this mixed empirical evidence, the widespread belief that HFT
operates unchecked has decreased investor confidence. Fear of manipula-
tive HFT has driven some retail investors out of the market. For instance,
a recent poll of consumer confidence found that only 15% of respondents
“trust[ed]” stock markets.179 Alarmingly, many also feel that HFT is re-
sponsible for creating a “two-tiered” secondary market.180 HFT firms
often pay exchanges huge sums to get direct access to their trade data and
place their servers near to their order processing servers, known as coloca-
tion.181 Many market centers also give HFTs customized order types that
help these trading strategies work more effectively.182 Several of these or-
der types, harm market transparency, increase market complexity, and
create situations where certain HFT strategies can unfairly exploit non-
HFT investors.
Professor Charles Korsmo has defended the current market structure
by pointing to its more “democratic” virtues. Anyone can get open access
to co-location, data feeds, and specialized order types if they are willing to
pay for them, resulting in a system which is “far more ‘democratic’ than
what came before.”183 He further points to decreasing HFT profits as mar-
175. Id.
176. BLACKROCK, US Equity Market Structure: An Investor Perspective, http://www
.blackrock.com/corporate/en-es/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-us-equity-market-structure-
april-2014.pdf.
177. See Lin Tong, A Blessing or a Curse? The Impact of High Frequency Trading on
Institutional Investors, (Euro. Fin. Ass’n 2014 Paper Series, Oct. 13, 2015).
178. Ken Froot, David Scharfstein, & Jeremy Stein, Herd on the Street: Informational
Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation, 47 J. FIN. 1461 (1992).
179. Merrin, supra note 22.
180. See Bullock, supra note 87.
181. See, e.g., Keri Geiger and Sam Mamudi, High-Speed Trading Faces New York
Probe Into Fairness, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-03-18/high-speed-trading-said-to-face-n-y-probe-into-fairness.
182. PATTERSON, supra note 8, at 48-49.
183. See Korsmo, supra note 143.
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kets adapt to its presence.184 These arguments, however, do not negate the
need to boost investor confidence. Policymakers must root out remnants
of unfairness to ensure investors continue participating in the capital-rais-
ing process.
CONCLUSION
HFT is an intricate solution to intricate problems. Yet as is often the
case, regulators face even more complex problems than before. This arti-
cle has tried to identify these problems in a way that does not obscure
HFT’s historical origins or the ways it has helped markets grow and inves-
tors prosper. Instead, it offers a baseline platform off which intelligent dis-
cussion regarding HFT can take place. As they say, and as is especially
relevant here, you must be able to walk before you can run.
184. Id.
